Smith’s purpose statement is clear: “It is my purpose…to demonstrate that the belief in god is irrational to the point of absurdity; and that this irrationality, when manifested in specific religions such as Christianity, is extremely harmful” (xi). George Smith argues again that Christianity is absurd and harmful. When one considers his reasoning, it is not difficult to see why he thinks thusly. If Christianity makes moral assertions then the atheist better respond by saying that it is absurd and harmful. If Christianity assumes exclusivity, then atheism better fear. Atheism must by nature see any other alternative as dangerous because it undermines their general premise: there is no god.
“If a person wishes to continue believing in god, that is his prerogative, but he can no longer excuse his belief in the name of reason and moral necessity” (xi). This is a fine illustration of the atheistic ultimatum: Renounce reason if you desire to follow your god. If this were a genuine either/or, the Christian would gladly renounce reason to follow his God. But “reason” for the atheist is not the same “reason” that Christians follow. The atheist sees no reason to allow Biblical revelation to guide their lives; rather they replace it with their humanistic standards. John Frame writes that “if we ask what his ultimate presupposition is, the most basic commitment of his heart, we would have to say that it is unbelief—a passionate desire to oppose and to frustrate God’s purposes” (John Frame, Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, p.126).
As Frame notes, it is a “passionate desire” to dethrone God’s prevalence in the morality of society. This desire is surely fruitless if it is framed on the ability to reason outside of God’s world. Further, Smith concludes that we cannot excuse our belief in God as “moral necessity.” Here he once again borrows Christian language. Notice that moral necessity is always contingent on morality. Where Smith finds “morality” in his god-less system is yet to be proven.
In the latter section of his introduction he gives his reasoning for the usage of “god” (with and without capitalization) in two different ways. “God” with little “g” refers to the “generic idea of god” (xii), “God” with capital “G” refers to the God of Christianity. This method facilitates his differentiation of “gods.” Smith is trained against the arguments for the existence of the Christian God. He sees the Christian God as the general threat to his assumed neutrality. His general “god” versus the Christian “God” is an unrewarding enterprise for it hides his specific intent of responding to Christianity. Nevertheless, George Smith has laid out his cards on the table with clarity. Herein begins his journey towards the impossible.